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ANCHORS AWEIGH: ANALYZING BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENSHIP AS DECLARED (NOT ESTABLISHED) BY
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Elizabeth Farrington *
INTRODUCTION
Much has been and will be said concerning President Donald
Trump's immigration policies. The vast majority of commentary
has focused on his plans to enforce existing policy by deporting
undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States
and, of course, to build a wall on the United States border with
Mexico. Less has been said, however, about any potential plans to
change existing law regarding birthright citizenship-the process
by which children of undocumented immigrants born on United
States soil are granted full citizenship status.
On what he calls "anchor babies," President Trump wrote:
"[W]omen who have zero connection to the United States cross
the border, deliver a baby, and their kid magically becomes an
American citizen eligible to receive all the rights and benefits of
those who have lived, worked, and paid taxes in our country."'
Mr. Trump notes the constitutional provision allowing this prac-
tice is, of course, the Fourteenth Amendment. Passed in June
18662 and ratified two years later (after contentious debate),' it
provides in pertinent part: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."4 This
clause has historically granted citizenship to "anyone born on
* Judicial Law Clerk to the Hon. Nanette K. Laughrey, Western District of Missouri.
J.D., 2016, University of Illinois College of Law; M.A., 2013, Old Dominion University;
B.S., 2007, United States Naval Academy.
1. DONALDJ. TRUMP, TIME TO GET TOUGH: MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 141 (2011).
2. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040 (June 8, 1866) (recording passage in the
Senate); id. at 3148 (June 13, 1866) (recording passage in the House of Representatives).
3. 13 Stat. 708-11 (July 28, 1868).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
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American territory, no matter their national origin, ethnicity, or
station in life."5
Relatively recently, this interpretation has come under fire.
Some scholars believe we must repeal this clause due to policy
concerns surrounding immigration and undocumented immi-
grants. Others argue that we could remove the promises of birth-
right citizenship without repealing the clause or the amendment;
they argue that we have misinterpreted this clause.' This is not
merely a scholarly debate; the Pew Institute estimates nearly
300,000 children were birthed into citizenship under this clause
in 2013.' Though President Trump espoused his views on the is-
sue loudest and most often, every presidential candidate-on both
sides of the aisle-spoke publicly about birthright citizenship.'
This essay aims to analyze this debate without regard to political
party or current policy implications. Rather, this essay will seek
to find its own answer to the growing birthright citizenship de-
bate, drawing on primary sources from the time it was passed
(and applied to a few nineteenth century cases after the Recon-
struction Amendments were passed).
The amendment was passed in response to, inter alia, the Dred
Scott decision denying citizenship to former slaves;9 in that re-
spect, the citizenship clause was perhaps included to guarantee
the right to citizenship for all newly freed African Americans born
within United States borders. Although this clause seemed to put
forth a straightforward test, that anyone born within the coun-
try's borders is a citizen, some argue it was passed only to grant
citizenship to former slaves freed by the Thirteenth Amendment
and that full birthright citizenship is not warranted."
5. Gerald Walping, David B. Rivkin, Jr. & John C. Yoo, Birthright Citizenship: Two
Perspectives, 17 ENGAGE 21 (Feb. 2016).
6. See id. at 21-22; Walping et al., supra note 5, at 18-21; John C. Eastman, We Can
Apply the 14th Amendment While Also Reforming Birthright Citizenship, NAT'L REV. (Aug.
24, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/422960/birthright-citizenship-
reform-it-without-repealing-14th-amendment; Peter Schuck, Birthright of a Nation, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/opinionI14schuck.html?_r=l.
7. Jeffrey S. Passel & DVera Cohn, Number of Babies Born in U.S. to Unauthorized
Immigrants Declines, PEW RESEARCH (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank2015/09/11/number-of-babies-born-in-u-s-to-unauthorized-immigrants-declines/.
8. See Mark Murray, Where the GOP 2016 Candidates Stand on Birthright Citizen-
ship, MSNBC (Aug. 18, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/where-the-gop-
2016-candidates-stand-birthright-citizenship.
9. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. Id. at 406
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This essay argues that birthright citizenship is in accordance
with both the original intent and public understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause. Furthermore, it ar-
gues that Congress' inclusion of the clause was not to change the
definition of citizenship, but rather to affirm the practice estab-
lished long before Reconstruction. For that reason, Part I will
briefly address the early English common law of jus solis11 (citi-
zenship defined by soil) and the other option available after the
revolution, jus sanguinis"2 (citizenship defined by blood). Part I
will also analyze the effect of Dred Scott v. Sanford, where Chief
Justice Taney struck down the Compromise of 1850 and held that
slaves could never be citizens despite their birth on U.S. soil.
13
Next, and most importantly, this essay will turn to Reconstruc-
tion in Part II. Specifically, it will analyze Attorney General
Bates' 1862 opinion regarding the citizenship of a free, black ship
master, providing unique insight into the question of citizenship
prior to formal Reconstruction. Next, drawing on the citizenship
clause debates surrounding both the Civil Rights Act and the
clause in the amendment itself, this essay will address the "fram-
ers' intent" standard, insofar as anyone can surmise such intent
from the text of debates and speeches alone. Finally, Part III will
look to Reconstruction-era legal scholarship to provide insight on
public meaning and then to instances following Reconstruction
when the Supreme Court or lower courts applied or interpreted
birthright citizenship immediately after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified.
Using all of the above, this essay will outline the absurdity of
the birthright citizenship debate. That is, the historical analysis
proves that the clause was enacted with, at the very least, full
acknowledgement of the effect of guaranteeing birthright citizen-
ship and, in some cases, shows the explicit intent to do so. This
paper argues the clause was included to overrule Dred Scott and
was intended to reach beyond newly freed slaves and their chil-
dren; it was included not to expand citizenship, but to declare and
ensure jus solis remained the supreme law of the land.
11. Jus Soli, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
12. Jus Sanguinis, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
13. 60 U.S. at 397-99, 427.
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I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: How DID WE GET HERE?
A. English Common Law: The First United States Citizens and
the Doctrine of Jus Solis
Citizenship was one of the many doctrines early American
courts adopted from the English Common Law. According to
Blackstone: "The children of aliens, born here in England, are
generally speaking, natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the
privileges of such."14 Across the ocean, then, "[w]ith the exception
of a few years before the Civil War, the United States followed
the British rule of jus solis (citizenship defined by birthplace), ra-
ther than the rule of jus sanguinis (citizenship defined by that of
parents) that prevails in much of continental Europe."'5
This doctrine is seen throughout English and American com-
mon law cases;" most notably in Calvin's Case,7 "one of the most
important English common-law decisions adopted by courts in the
early history of the United States."'8 In Calvin's Case, the court
addressed the question of whether persons born in Scotland, fol-
lowing the descent of the English crown to the Scottish King
James VI, would be considered "subjects" in England. 9 The court
found that persons born on sovereign land, no matter the status
of his or her parents, were "natural subjects."2 This decision es-
tablished "the American common-law rule of birthright citizen-
ship.""Across the pond, the United States Supreme Court cited
Calvin's Case and found that "[n]othing is better settled at the
common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens
14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 (1765);
see also JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 33 (3rd ed. 1827) ("Natives are
all persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States."); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 86 (2d ed. 1829) ("[E]very person
born within the United States, its territories or districts, whether the parents are citizens
or aliens, is a natural born citizen in the sense of the Constitution.").
15. Walping et al., supra note 5.
16. But see Mark Shawhan, '2By Virtue of Being Born Here": Birthright Citizenship
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (discussing a "Con-
sensualist Alternative" to this doctrine).
17. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
18. Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 74 (1997).
19. Id. at 73.
20. Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 383 ("By all which it evidently appeareth, that they that
are born under the obedience, power, faith, ligealty, or ligeance of the King, are natural
subjects, and no aliens.").
21. See Price, supra note 18, at 74.
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born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the
protection of the governments, and owing a temporary allegiance
thereto, are subjects by birth."22 This case remains good law, and
is cited to this day."3
B. Dred Scott and the Court's Role in the Civil War
In 1820, President James Monroe signed the Missouri Com-
promise,24 "which prohibited slavery in all of the federal territo-
ries north and west of the state of Missouri."25 Fourteen years lat-
er, enter Dred Scott, a slave belonging to a United States Army
surgeon.26 That surgeon, Dr. Emerson, took Scott with him to Illi-
nois and to present day Minnesota, an area covered by the Mis-
souri Compromise's prohibition on slavery.27 Mr. Scott later at-
tempted to buy his freedom, and when Dr. Emerson's wife refused
(Dr. Emerson himself having died), Scott sued for his freedom.28
After lengthy legal battles, Scott's case (now in the form of Scott
v. Sandford) eventually made its way to the United States Su-
preme Court. This decision is taught in every law school in the
country and widely discussed in constitutional scholarship,29
largely due to its timeliness (immediately before the Civil War),
its implications, and the nature of the opinion itself, with each of
the nine justices penning an opinion. Chief Justice Taney's major-
ity opinion, despite finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
found that slaves were ineligible for citizenship and denied Scott
his freedom. Taney did not discuss the doctrine of jus soli, nor
did he find the place of Scott's birth relevant. Rather, he found
that black Americans were excluded altogether from citizenship
on account of their race and status. Justices Curtis dissented (as
22. Inglis v. Tr. of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 164 (1830).
23. See, e.g., Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Inglis,
28 U.S. at 164) ("The doctrine of jus soli is an inheritance from the English common law.
Those born 'within the King's domain' and 'within the obedience or ligeance of the King'
were subjects of the King, or 'citizens' in modern parlance. The domain of the King was
defined broadly. It extended beyond the British Isles to include, for example, persons born
in the American colonies.").
24. Missouri Compromise of 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545.
25. Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court's Most Dreadful Case and How It
Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4 (2007).
26. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1856).
27. See also Finkelman, supra note 25, at 15; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 51 (2006).
28. Finkelman, supra note 25, at 19-20.
29. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 25, at 3; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 27, at 49.
30. See Scott, 60 U.S. at 427.
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did Justice McLean); in Justice Curtis' seventy-page dissent, he
noted:
I can find nothing in the Constitution which, proprio vigore, deprives
of their citizenship any class of persons who were citizens of the
United States at the time of its adoption, or who should be native-
born citizens of any State after its adoption; nor any power enabling
Congress to disfranchise persons born on the soil of any State, and
entitled to citizenship of such State by its Constitution and laws.
And my opinion is, that, under the Constitution of the United States,
every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that
State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the
United States.3 '
Curtis, then, had a fundamentally different understanding of citi-
zenship-and the possibility of black citizenship-than Taney
and the rest of the majority. To Curtis, the Constitution's use of
"natural-born citizen" "assumes that citizenship may be acquired
by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used
in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this
country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which re-
ferred citizenship to the place of birth.' 2 The majority opinion
was lauded by Southerners and many Northern Democrats, who
"hoped it would forever end debate over slavery in the territories
and, thus, eliminate the newly formed Republican Party as a po-
litical force in the North."" Republicans had a different plan, and
the opinion simply fanned the flames of an increasingly fragile
union of states: "Though surely an exaggeration, it has been said
that the case caused the Civil War. While other forces caused se-
cession and the War, Dred Scott surely played a role in the timing
of both."'4
References to this decision are found throughout the Congres-
sional Globe, even before the records of the 39th Congress and
throughout Reconstruction." Representative Calvin Chaffee, for
example, explained that "[t]he dictum of the Court is a very dif-
ferent affair from a decision,"'6 and that became the party line for
Republicans seeking to use the opinion (and Justice Curtis' dis-
31. Id. at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Finkelman, supra note 25, at 5.
34. Id. at 3.
35. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1116 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wil-
son) ('The opinion of the court was soon after given to the country, but instead of becoming
a triumphant platform for the Democratic party, it proved to be the scaffold on which the
party was executed.").
36. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 854 (1858) (statement of Rep. Chaffee).
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sent) in their favor. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
often cited to the decision when probed on the necessity of the
law. Cases following Reconstruction cited the decision as the im-
petus of the Reconstruction Amendments generally and the Four-
teenth Amendment in particular.37 Frederick Douglas "optimisti-
cally predicted that, in the long run, the decision would help the
antislavery movement .... [Tihis decision would lead to more
support for abolitionists and thus put greater pressure on slav-
ery."" And he was right, as the decade that followed brought
about the bloodiest war in American history, but also brought
with it the abolition of slavery and Reconstruction.
II. RECONSTRUCTION
A. Attorney General Bates on Citizenship
Edward Bates, a Republican Congressman from Missouri, un-
successfully ran for his party's presidential nomination in 1860,
but his loss was short-lived: President Lincoln appointed him At-
torney General in 1861. 39 Just one year into his appointment,
Treasury Secretary Chase sent Bates a letter asking for his opin-
ion on "whether or not colored men can be citizens of the United
States."4 The question was posed in response to a ship command-
ed by a free black man detained off the coast of New Jersey. Bates
explained: "The Constitution of the United States does not de-
clare who are and who are not citizens, nor does it attempt to de-
scribe the constituent elements of citizenship. It leaves that qual-
ity where it found it, resting upon the fact of home-birth, and
upon the laws of the several States."'" Drawing from Calvin's
Case, he wrote that the Constitution "uses the word citizen only
to express the political quality of the individual in his relations to
37. See, e.g., In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 909 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (Field, J., on cir-
cuit) ('"The clause as to citizenship was inserted in the amendment not merely as an au-
thoritative declaration of the generally recognized law of the country, so far as the white
race is concerned, but also to overrule the doctrine of the Dred Scott Case, affirming that
persons of the African race brought to this country and sold as slaves, and their descend-
ants, were not citizens of the United States, nor capable of becoming such.")
38. Finkleman, supra note 25, at 12-13.
39. Cabinet and Vice Presidents: Edward Bates (1793-1869), MR. LINCOLN'S WHITE
HOUSE, http://www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.org/residents-visitors/cabinet-vice-presidents/ca
binet-and-vice-presidents-edward-bates-1 7 93-18 6 9 ! (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); Edward
Bates (1861-1864)--Attorney General, MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., http:/
millercenter.org/president/essays/bates-1861-attorney-general (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
40. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 382 (1862).
41. Id. at 385.
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the nation; to declare that he is a member of the body politic, and
bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the one
side and protection on the other."42
Much of Bates' opinion is devoted to traits or privileges of citi-
zenship, and understandably focuses on correcting the dangerous
notion that there is a lower, "denizen" class of black citizens, but
one crucial passage provides insight on birthright citizenship as
Bates understood it: "We have natural born citizens, not made by
law or otherwise, but born ... The Constitution itself does not
make the citizens ... It only intends and recognizes such of them
as are natural-home-born; and provides for the naturalization of
such of them as were ... foreign-born."43 He continued:
[I]t is too late now to deny the political rights and obligations con-
ferred and imposed by nativity; for our laws do not pretend to create
or enact them, but do assume and recognize them as things known to
all men, because pre-existent and natural; and therefore things of
which the laws must take cognizance.... [P]rima facie, every person
in this country is born a citizen."
With that, Bates issued his opinion and answered Chase's ques-
tion about black citizenship with a resounding "yes"-and gave a
formal endorsement of birthright citizenship in the process.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
As Congress was drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Thirty-ninth Congress had already declared "all persons born in
the United States and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding
Indians not taxed.., to be citizens of the United States" in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866." On January 5, 1866, Senator Lyman
Trumbull (R-IL) introduced S. No. 61, a bill "to protect all persons
in the United States in their civil rights and furnish the means of
their vindication."46 Trumbull believed the Citizenship Clause,
which "declares that all persons of African descent shall be citi-
zens of the United States," was "the basis of the whole bill."47
Senator Morrill (R-ME) found that the bill was "not an enact-
ment in the sense of the law, in the sense of legislation, but a dec-
42. Id. at 388 (internal citation omitted).
43. Id. at 389.
44. Id. at 395-96.
45. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
46. Id. at 129.
47. Id. at 474.
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laration of a grand, fundamental principle of law and politics,"48
and hailed it as such. Responding to opposition from Senator
Garrett Davis (D-KY), Morrill said:
As matter of law, does anybody deny here or anywhere that the na-
tive born is a citizen, and a citizen by virtue of his birth alone?...
[Davis] has forgotten the grand principle both of nature and nations,
both of law and politics, that birth gives citizenship of itself... Eve-
rywhere where the principles of law have been recognized at all,
birth by its inherent energy and force gives citizenship ... The Con-
stitution speaks of "natural born," and speaks of them as citizens in
contradistinction from those who are alien to us. Therefore, sir, this
amendment, although it is a grand enunciation, although it is a lofty
and sublime declaration, has no force or efficiency as an enactment. I
hail it and accept it simply as a declaration.49
For purposes of citizenship, then, Senator Morrill understood
birthright citizenship in the jus solis sense prior to Reconstruc-
tion and saw formal codification as nothing more than an affirma-
tion of existing law. Trumbull generally agreed, noting that he
and Morrill "desire to arrive at the same point precisely, and that
is to make citizens of everybody born in the United States who
owe allegiance to the United States. '" The qualification Trumbull
made was for foreign diplomats: 'We cannot make a citizen of the
child of a foreign minister who is temporarily residing here. 51
Not everyone agreed with Senator Trumbull, with Senator
Garrett Davis (D-KY) serving as the most vocal opponent. He
challenged the proposition that the bill was merely declaratory
law, and instead insisted that "Congress may create the [uniform
rule of naturalization]; it may prescribe the authority to make a
citizen; but it cannot exercise that power itself .... Congress has
no power to make a citizen."5 Senator Davis was not alone in his
objections,53 but he was unable to convince the Senate; the bill
passed on February 2, by a vote of thirty-three to twelve.4
As the bill proceeded to the House (where the citizenship clause
was not heavily debated), Representative James Wilson (R-IA)
concurred with Senator Morrill that the citizenship clause formal-
ly declared the already settled law: "This provision, I maintain, is
48. Id. at 570.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 572.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 597.
53. See, e.g., id. at 600 (statement of Sen. Guthrie).
54. Id. at 606-07.
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merely declaratory of what the law now is."55 Representative Wil-
son proceeded to cite relevant legal authority and precedent in
support of his conclusion 56 before voting for the bill, which passed
in the House on March 13 by a vote of 111-38 (with 34 not vot-
ing).57
Shocking members of both houses, President Johnson vetoed
the Civil Rights Bill two weeks later, noting among his objections
his concern with "granting" citizenship:
This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indi-
ans subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the en-
tire race designated as blacks, people of color, negroes, mulattoes,
and persons of African blood. Every individual of these races, born in
the United States, is by the bill made a citizen of the United
States.... The right of Federal citizenship, thus to be conferred in
the several excepted races before mentioned, is now, for the first
time, proposed to be given by law. If, as is claimed by many, all per-
sons who are native-born, already are, by virtue of the Constitution,
citizens of the United States, the passage of the pending bill cannot
be necessary to make them such. If, on the other hand, such persons
are not citizens, as may be assumed from the proposed legislation to
make them such, the grave question presents itself, whether, when
eleven of the thirty-six States are unrepresented in Congress, at this
time it is sound policy to make our entire colored population and all
other excepted classes citizens of the United States?"8
Thus, even President Johnson acknowledged the thesis of this es-
say; that is, many understood birthright citizenship as the exist-
ing law, merely declared in this bill, and even those that rejected
that premise understood the effect of birthright citizenship. This
portion of his veto seems to argue that the citizenship provision is
either redundant (because it is already the law) or entrenches
birthright citizenship without input from Southern representa-
tives. Crucially, over these and President Johnson's other objec-
tions, Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill with the two-thirds
majority required to override, and the Act became law on April 9,
1866. 59
This discussion is valuable to the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the members drafting, debating,
and passing the Act were, of course, those same members draft-
55. Id. at 1115.
56. See id. at 1116 (quoting 1 SHERWOOD'S BLACKSTONE 304).
57. Id. at 1367.
58. Id. at 1679.
59. Id. at 1809, 1861.
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ing, debating, and passing the amendment. Moreover, "the [Four-
teenth Amendment's Citizenship] Clause was intended to en-
trench an earlier statutory citizenship guarantee in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866."' Clearest of all, the United States Supreme
Court noted that the two pieces of legislation were linked and its
use of language was in no way coincidental: "The same congress,
shortly [after passing the Civil Rights Act], evidently thinking it
unwise, and perhaps unsafe, to leave so important a declaration
of rights to depend upon an ordinary act of legislation, which
might be repealed by any subsequent congress, framed the four-
teenth amendment of the constitution." 1
C. The Fourteenth Amendment's Section One
One issue with analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment's citizen-
ship debate is that the same members, having understood it dur-
ing the Civil Rights Act, felt the matter was settled by the time
the clause was introduced in this separate context. The "debate"
on the clause was correspondingly much shorter than other provi-
sions (i.e., the Equal Protection Clause debates). Nevertheless,
Congress did introduce and discuss the amendment's citizenship
provision, as outlined below. Introducing it on May 30, 1866, the
clause's author Senator Jacob Howard (R-MI) explained:
I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the ques-
tion of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to
need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which
I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the
land already, that every person born within the limits of the United
States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law
and national law a citizen of the United States.
62
That, in and of itself, is not only innocuous, it seems to support
the premise that the Citizenship Clause-both in the Civil Rights
Act (to which Howard refers) and the Fourteenth Amendment-
was merely declaring formally the established doctrine of jus soli.
Howard did not stop there, though, and his next statement is the
loose end to which birthright citizenship opponents cling: "This
will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who
are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of embassadors
[sic] or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the
60. Shawhan, supra note 16, at 2.
61. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898).
62. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
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United States, but will include every other class of persons. '
Senator Howard's proposal was immediately discussed, but main-
ly within the context of the Indian population.64
Senator Cowan (R-PA), the first to give Senator Howard's
clause a closer look, "supposed that every human being within
their jurisdiction was in one sense of the word a citizen, that is, a
person entitled to protection."65 That concept frightened Cowan,
who noted Chinese immigration to California, and feared that if a
state "was likely to be invaded by a flood of Australians or people
from Borneo, man-eaters or cannibals if you please, [that state]
would have the right to say that those people should not come
there."66 He went on:
[Tihere are nations of people with whom theft is a virtue and false-
hood a merit. There are people to whom polygamy is as natural as
monogamy is with us. It is utterly impossible that these people can
meet together and enjoy their several rights and privileges which
they suppose to be natural in the same society; and it is neces-
67sary.. . that society shall be more or less exclusive.
That xenophobia notwithstanding, over the course of the next few
days, several other Senators weighed in on the matter, and in do-
ing so lent no support to the concept that this proposed Citizen-
ship Clause should (or would) remove the doctrine of jus soli from
the established law.
Senator Conness (R-CA) responded immediately to Senator
Cowan's fears about the impending invasion of his own Califor-
nia. He succinctly and directly addressed Senator Howard:
The proposition before us ... relates simply in that respect to the
children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed
to declare that they shall be citizens. We have declared that by law;
now it is proposed to incorporate the same provision in the funda-
mental instrument of the nation. I am in favor of doing so. I voted for
63. Id.
64. Id. (statement of Sen. Doolittle) ("I presume the honorable Senator from Michigan
does not intend by this amendment to include the Indians. I move, therefore, to amend the
amendment-I presume he will have no objection to it-by inserting after the word 'there-
of the words 'excluding Indians not taxed."'); id. (statement of Sen. Howard) ("Indians
born within the limits of the United States, and who maintain their tribal relations, are
not, in the sense of this amendment, born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
They are regarded, and always have been in our legislation and jurisprudence, as being
quasi foreign nations.").
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2891.
67. Id.
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the proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatev-
er, born in California, should be regarded and treated as citizens of
the United States, entitled to equal civil rights with other citizens of
the United States.68
He then "beg[ged]" Senator Cowan not to concern himself with
the Chinese, and noted with incredulity the notion that the Unit-
ed States was being overtaken by Gypsies and other immigrants
while expressing his belief that these individuals must be pro-
tected in their civil rights.
Senator Reverdy Johnson, a Democrat (D-MD), followed Sena-
tor Conness' lead. Expressing concern for the lack of defined
United States citizenship, he said:
Now, all that this amendment provides is, that all persons born in
the United States and not subject to some foreign Power... shall be
considered as citizens of the United States .... If there are to be citi-
zens of the United States entitled everywhere to the character of cit-
izens of the United States there should be some certain definition of
what citizenship is, what has created the character of citizen as be-
tween himself and the United States, and the amendment says that
citizenship may depend upon birth, and I know of no better way to
give rise to citizenship than the fact of birth within the territory of
the United States, born of parents who at the time were subject to
the authority of the United States.' 9
Two weeks later, the Senate once again took up the issue of Sena-
tor Howard's Citizenship Clause. Senator Henderson (R-MO) be-
gan the discussion and was the last Senator to speak on the issue:
I propose to discuss the first section only so far as citizenship is in-
volved in it. I desire to show that this section will leave citizenship
where it now is. It makes plain only what has been rendered doubt-
ful by the past action of the Government. ... Justice McLean, in the
Dred Scott case, said: "Being born under our Constitution and laws,
no naturalization is required, as one of foreign birth, to make him a
citizen. The most eneral and appropriate definition of the term citi-
zen is a 'freeman.
Henderson understood Justice McLean's dissent to mean "that
any person, black or white, born upon the soil of a State, is a citi-
zen of that State, unless he be born in slavery, and if he be born a
slave, he becomes a citizen so soon as by the laws of the State he
becomes a free man."71 Thus, the citizenship debate ended with
Senator Henderson's statement: "All born on the soil free are citi-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2893.
70. Id. at 3031.
71. Id.
20171
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
zens of the respective States of their birth, and therefore citizens
of the United States. 72
III. EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC MEANING
A. Scholarship
Early Supreme Court cases used conventions of British com-
mon law to interpret it's constitutional meaning, including not
only Calvin's Case but also Sir Edward Coke's report on the case,
who insisted that the King's reciprocal obligations to a subject's
allegiance protected the rights of any subject born within his do-
main.72 Of course, it was not only the courts that seemed to adopt
this understanding. Several prominent law review articles con-
tribute to the discussion, with near unanimous support for the jus
soli understanding of citizenship.74 Thus, pre-Reconstruction, the
generally accepted public meaning of birthright citizenship was
relatively unchallenged: "[A] child was a citizen at birth if born
within the territory of a sovereign and under the sovereign's au-
thority. This was true even if the child's parents were aliens."75
Insofar as scholars can accurately provide evidence of public
meaning, this understanding is supported by St. George Tucker,"
William Rawle,77 Joseph Story," and James Kent: "In drafting
the Fourteenth Amendment, the framers drew on preexisting le-
gal terminology. Hence, if 'jurisdiction' originally meant 'sover-
72. Id.
73. See Price, supra note 18, at 73-74; Nicole Newman, Birthright Citizenship: The
Fourteenth Amendment's Continuing Protection Against an American Case System, 28 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 437, 445 (2008).
74. For an overview of this literature, see Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birth-
right Citizenship, 1868-1898: States'Rights, the Law of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519, 532-37 (2001); John A. Hayward, Who Are Citizens?, 2 AM. L.J.
315, 317 (1885); Thomas P. Stoney, Citizenship, 34 AM. L. REG. 1, 1-2 (1886); D.H.
Pingrey, Citizens, Their Rights and Immunities, 36 AM. L. REG. 539, 540 (1888); cf. Henry
C. Ide, Citizenship by Birth-Another View, 30 AM. L. REV. 241, 241 (1896).
75. Matthew Ing, Birthright Citizenship, Illegal Aliens, and the Original Meaning of
the Citizenship Clause, 45 AKRON L. REV. 719, 725 (2012).
76. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 152 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
77. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 236 (2d ed. 1829).
78. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1646 (1833).
79. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 15 (William Kent ed., 9th ed.
1858).
[Vol. 51:71
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
eign authority' at the framing, we should expect to see this mean-
ing used in antebellum discourse. A variety of sources demon-
strate that it was."80
B. Court Cases
Though not entirely helpful for understanding the Framer's in-
tent surrounding birthright citizenship, Supreme Court decisions
concerning citizenship (or, as in The Slaughterhouse Cases, cases
that discuss the concept in dicta) help frame our understanding of
the public meaning.
1. The Slaughterhouse Cases (and Their Limited Utility)
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, just five years after the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified, the Court famously found that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect citizens
against state encroachment, but rather protected only those con-
ferred by the federal government.81 In dicta, the Court wrote that
"[t]he phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude
from its operation children of ... citizens or subjects of foreign
States born within the United States."82 Opponents of birthright
citizenship argue that this is "as absolute and complete a state-
ment as can be imagined, and it would deny birthright citizenship
to a child born in this country to undocumented immigrants or to
a transient alien mother."83 As further proof, opponents point to
Minor v. Happersett, decided just two years after Slaughterhouse,
where the same Court "expressly recognized the existence of
'doubts' that citizenship was automatic for 'children born within
the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their par-
ents,' after noting that citizenship attaches only when the immi-
grant owes 'allegiance' to this country."84
While noting the non-binding nature of these provisions, Ger-
ald Walpin argues that both opinions "should be considered au-
thoritative insofar as they were expressed by Justices who lived
through the enactment of the provision they were construing, and
80. Ing, supra note 75, at 725-29 (discussing treatises and state court opinions on the
subject).
81. 83 U.S. 36, 73, 80 (1873).
82. Id.
83. Walping et al., supra note 5, at 18.
84. Id. (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1875)).
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thus were well positioned to comprehend the meaning and inten-
tion of the words."85 If that was all the Court said on the matter
during the decades immediately following Reconstruction, that
would seem a valid proposition. However, that was not the end of
the discussion, even in that case. Mr. Justice Field, in a dissent-
ing opinion, in which Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne
and Bradley concurred, said of the same clause: "It recognizes in
express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States,
and it makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their
birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution
or laws of any state or the condition of their ancestry."" What's
more, the Court backed away from the majority Slaughterhouse
decision and, in later cases, seemingly directly overruled that por-
tion of the decision that addressed birthright citizenship.
In 1884, Justice Field was on circuit in California and heard
the case of In re Look Tin Sing concerning the citizenship of a
child born in the United States of Chinese parents. 7 To use Wal-
pin's own words, Justice Field's decision on the matter is as abso-
lute and complete a statement on the matter as could be imag-
ined, especially since the case was specifically about birthright
citizenship.' Quoting the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Field explains: "This language would seem to be suf-
ficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person
born in the United States."89 He goes on to explain the phrase
"subject to the jurisdiction thereof':
They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who
are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws,
and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can
be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturaliza-
tion are within the terms of the amendment. 90
Justice Field listed those children that would not be guaran-
teed citizenship by virtue of their birth: (1) "children born in
the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service
of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors";91 (2)
85. Id. ("Note that, because the meaning of the Birthright Citizenship provision did
not determine the outcome in either case, the Court's statements in both decisions are dic-
ta, not binding holdings.").
86. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 95.
87. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
88. Walping et al., supra note 5.
89. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. at 906 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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"[p]ersons born on a public vessel of a foreign country, while with-
in the waters of the United States, and consequently within their
territorial jurisdiction";92 (3) persons who, though born or natural-
ized in the United States, have renounced their allegiance to our
government, and thus dissolved their political connection with
the country."93 Directly contradicting the Slaughterhouse Cases,
Justice Field explains:
[T]he words in the fourteenth amendment, "subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof,"... do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen.
He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizen-
ship, and the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time
of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.
9 4
Of course, Justice Field's opinion is not that of the Court, but ra-
ther his opinion binding only on courts within the California Cir-
cuit Court's jurisdiction. But it does effectively demonstrate that
not all justices agreed with the Slaughterhouse dicta's treatment
of the Citizenship Clause.
2. United States v. Wong Kim Ark
Two months after Look Tin Sing, in November 1884, the Court
(and not simply Justice Field) issued some guidance in Elk v.
Wilkins.95 Opponents of birthright citizenship also cite to this de-
cision as proof positive that the Court (and public meaning at the
time) understood the Citizenship Clause as reported in the
Slaughterhouse dicta. This mistakes the facts of the case; John
Elk was a Winnebago Indian, born on an Indian reservation, who
later renounced his tribal allegiance in an effort to gain U.S. citi-
zenship.' Thus, when the Court found that Mr. Elk was not a cit-
izen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
did so within the context of the contentious debate surrounding
the sovereignty of Indian tribes and the reach of the court system
within that sovereignty.97
92. Id.
93. Id. at 907.
94. Id. at 908-09.
95. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
96. Id. at 94-95.
97. Id. at 109; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2895 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Howard) ("I am not yet prepared to pass a sweeping act of naturalization by which all
the Indian savages... are to become my fellow-citizens."); id. at 2897 (statement of Sen.
Doolittle) (classifying Indians as "utterly unfit to be citizens of the United States").
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Conversely, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark,98 the Court
squarely and definitively addressed the issue of birthright citi-
zenship in facts nearly identical to Look Tin Sing; that is, the
Court was asked to decide whether Ark, a child born in the Unit-
ed States to Chinese parents, was a United States citizen.99 After
Ark left to visit China temporarily and sought to return, he was
denied reentry "upon the sole ground that he was not a citizen of
the United States.""1 ' Distinguishing Elk was simple and succinct:
"The decision in Elk v. Wilkins concerned only members of the
Indian tribes within the United States, and had no tendency to
deny citizenship to children born in the United States of foreign
parents of Caucasian, African, or Mongolian descent, not in the
diplomatic service of a foreign country."'0 1 The Court found: "In
the fore front, both of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution, and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the fundamental prin-
ciple of citizenship by birth within the dominion was reaffirmed
in the most explicit and comprehensive terms."'' The majority
continued:
As appears upon the face of the amendment, as well as from the his-
tory of the times, this was not intended to impose any new re-
strictions upon citizenship, or to prevent any persons from becoming
citizens by the fact of birth within the United States, who would
thereby have become citizens according to the law existing before its
adoption. It is declaratory in form, and enabling and extending in ef-
fect.
1 3
The Court further distanced itself from Slaughterhouse, noting
the non-binding nature of the Citizenship Clause discussion. Cit-
ing Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court noted the maxim:
[N]ot to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expres-
sions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the
very point is presented for decision. 04
That maxim is of great use in this essay, because if the best ar-
guments against birthright citizenship, each discussed above, are
found in dicta, and in minority theories, they are indeed respect-
ed, but do not control the judgment of this subsequent debate.
98. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
99. Id. at 652-53.
100. Id. at 653.
101. Id. at 682.
102. Id. at 675.
103. Id. at 676.
104. Id. at 679 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of jus soli was the law of the land prior to the Civ-
il War and was formally constitutionalized by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Lawmakers, scholars, and the general public
agreed, at the very least, in an understanding that the citizenship
clause would guarantee birthright citizenship and, perhaps more
likely, intended that consequence. The current debate surround-
ing birthright citizenship is political, policy-driven, and-with re-
gard to immigration reform-may be necessary. But make no
mistake; this debate is not grounded in history. On that, history
is clear.

